Bangladesh's election day on 1 October 2001 was relatively peaceful. The election itself was relatively fair. But, things began to change immediately thereafter, indeed, right with the announcement of the election trends that indicated that the regime in power, the Awami League, was heading for the worst ever electoral performance by a national party in Bangladesh. A clear winner emerged in the combination of moderate and right-wing forces under the leadership of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The dramatic violence that soon erupted in many parts of the country had two notable characteristics.
The first is the routine post-election violence that is a part of Bangladesh's democratic history: Winners normally attack losers with an immense sense of pride and vengeance. The most conspicuous part of this violence is the seemingly biased role of the police, who either merely watch the spectacle or, more shamelessly, participate in the proceedings on the side of the winner. The second is more horrifying and concerns the attack on the minorities, mainly Hindu. Here, what is conspicuous is the participation of members of almost all major political parities – BNP, Jamaat-e-Islam, and even the Awami League, traditionally regarded as a pro-minority party. Needless to say, the police either looked on passively or, as is being alleged, was party to the attacks.
While there is a tendency to attribute partisan postelection violence to polarised politics and the culture of intolerance – something that has been politically and socially ingrained from the colonial period onwards – the attack on minorities is seen to be more an outcome of a global phenomenon, with the suffering of the Hindus mainly linked to their status as a minority in 'minority' in Bangladesh. There may be some truth to this view, but it does not capture the complex nature of an issue which is more 'internal' and related to the mode of governance that is pursued and practiced in Bangladesh. But before venturing on that issue, it is necessary to clarify one or two points related to the organisation of violence in Bangladesh.
Post-election violence is not something new here. There were violent incidents after both the 1991 and 1996 elections, although the scale was more modest than the last epidsode and the targets more dispersed and non-religious. Also, violence against Hindus took place even before election day, when the interim government was in place to conduct the polls. There were reports in mainstream newspapers that in several places (Sathkhira, for instance) it was the members of the Awami League who were involved in covertly harassing and attacking Hindus, possibly with the intention of blaming right-wing groups and winning the sympathy and votes of the minority and secular forces. This clearly suggests that violence against the Hindu community, although seemingly religious in intent, is actually more complex and, ironically, more secular in content.