Civilisationally speaking, we should be talking about the relationship between China and 'Indic' Southasia, rather than between China and the individual countries of our region. But there will be some romantic idealism attached to that notion, because the reality lies in the separate bilateral relations nurtured by each of our capitals with Beijing. And so, when we speak of Southasia's China policy, we are necessarily referring to the sum of seven or eight different China policies.
At Himal, we do not propose a one-size-fits-all China policy for all Southasia, but we do see the benefit in comparing notes between Islamabad, Delhi, Kathmandu, Dhaka and Colombo – if not between the diplomats then between academics, analysts and business leaders. It would surely be useful to have a minimally coordinated approach, especially as Beijing seems to have completely abandoned its ideology-export industry and become market-oriented and pragmatic in its dealings.
It becomes necessary to pay close attention to India's China strategy, as New Delhi's arrangements are bound to impact the rest of Southasia. In the era of economic globalisation, India sees itself as both a partner and competitor of China when it comes to world power status. The other capitals, in varying degrees, tend to highlight the importance of Beijing in their foreign policy radarscope, in an attempt to balance the overbearing presence of India in the neighbourhood. Pakistan's relationship with China also looms large because Islamabad is utilising the economic and geo-strategic openings to West Asia to increase its leverage with Beijing. The evolution of Gwadar port will be worth watching.
Himalayan paranoia