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Bedlam and belligerence

The 6 April killing of 76 personnel of the paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in a Maoist attack in Dantewada, in Chhattisgarh, is seen by many as a turning point in the Maoist-versus-government war in India. "If this is not the wake-up call," Home Minister P C Chidambaram said in Parliament, "then nothing will wake this country." From the government, such rhetoric is to be expected, given that it sees the attacks as constituting an opportunity to rally support for an all-out assault. But in fact, far from a landmark, game-changing event, the Dantewada violence, in which some Maoists too lost their lives, is one more milestone on the steady descent into the pit that has plagued Maoist-affected parts of India for years.

New Delhi has responded with further sabre-rattling, in effect threatening to launch a no-holds-barred war against the Maoists. There was renewed talk of involving the military, particularly the Air Force, in the conflict, which was fortunately quickly shot down by Air Chief Marshal P V Naik. Meanwhile, all political parties have rallied behind the government, with the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) having said, in the wake of reports that Chidambaram had offered to resign over the incident, that the home minister must stay on. Security analysts, while suggesting different tactics, ranging from all-out war to strategic targeting and assassination of key Maoist leaders, are likewise united in recommending an intensification of the conflict – a move that will doubtless lead to the loss of more lives.

On the Maoist side too there appears to be a hardening of positions. Of this, the Dantewada attack was the most dramatic example, but it was also preceded by the February attack on the Silda camp in West Bengal, which resulted in the deaths of 24 personnel of another paramilitary force, the Eastern Frontier Rifles. Offers for negotiations and ceasefires are now being made side by side with such attacks, leading to doubts about the seriousness of the Maoists.

Caught in the crossfire are the communities, mostly Adivasi, of Central India. These people are strictly 'neutral' or 'innocent', as some analysts would have it; but misconceived past initiatives such as creating armed militias like the Salwa Judum campaign in Chhattisgarh, and the lack of successful development initiatives, have only driven the people closer to the Maoists. The only time the state puts in an appearance in the forested regions where Maoism has evolved is as a predator, or as a middleman merrily selling land and resources on the cheap to domestic and multinational mining conglomerates. As such, with the Maoists among the few forces taking any practical, on-the-ground effort to mitigate the lot of these communities, the people are left with little choice but to turn to the Maoists for support. Helping the Maoist cause is the perception, not unfounded, that the Indian state refuses to take non-violent protest seriously.