With the release of Aung San Sui Kyi from house arrest in November, there has been a renewed feeling within Burma that progress, however slight, might be being made toward democracy and ethnic autonomy. But is this expectation realistic? Twenty years ago, Western countries began to impose sanctions on Burma due to the junta's failure to transfer power to the National League for Democracy (NLD), which had defeated the military regime in free and fair elections. Those sanctions have since been expanded in an effort to force Burma to free its political prisoners and move towards democratic governance, but have failed to attain either, particularly as General Than Shwe has forged closer relations with neighbouring countries. In turn, these countries, especially China, have used the Western sanctions as an opportunity to gain economic, political and strategic military advantages. China is now Burma's patron at the United Nations Security Council, and protects it from universal censure.
In August 2003, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the regime's official name, announced its 'Roadmap to Discipline-flourishing Democracy', a seven-step process toward restoring democracy to Burma and transitioning from direct military rule to civilian rule. With the recent elections, the first five steps have been completed, and the SPDC will soon begin to implement the final two steps – convening the newly elected legislature and building a 'modern, developed and democratic nation'. Initially, Suu Kyi represented a threat, both as a person and as the leader of the democratic opposition. Through skilful manoeuvring, however, Than Shwe has been able to effectively neutralise her as an immediate political threat, forcing even the dissolution of her political party. Often derided by his detractors as a simple postal clerk, ignorant and superstitious, Than Shwe has proven himself to be both shrewd and proactive, in addressing problems posed by both Suu Kyi and Western governments. Although his official role in the new set-up has not yet been determined, it should be expected that he will continue in a leadership position – and, thus, the grip of dictatorship will continue to strengthen.
Suu Kyi is now free from house arrest and, as in the past, continues to provide hope to the people of Burma. Since the 1990 elections, she has been considered by most Western countries to be the opposition leader in Burma. It was she who successfully lobbied the United States, the European Union and others in the West to impose the economic and political sanctions in the first place. However, Suu Kyi was unable to take advantage of the initial openings afforded by the imposition of sanctions and the initial dialogues with the military regime. For too long, she held fast to a central precondition: recognition of the results of the 1990 elections. With the ascension of China into the affairs of Burma, she failed to recognise, until it was too late, that the sanctions-based leverage with the SPDC had been lost. Also, her dialogues with the regime, through General Khin Nyunt, ceased with his political demise in 2004. Again, Suu Kyi had failed to make effective use of these dialogues to achieve even incremental results or 'small victories'.
The national convention to draw up a new constitution presented another opportunity for Suu Kyi and the NLD to engage in dialogue with representatives of the military regime and various ethnic groups. Despite the major flaws of this convention, it again provided a forum in which to work towards incremental results and build networks among representatives. Yet Suu Kyi and her party chose to stand on principle – withdrawing and boycotting the sessions until they were expelled from the convention.