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China, Southasia and India

The relationship between Southasia and China has necessarily to be seen through the prism of the relationship between India and China.

There was a time, not so long ago, when King Gyanendra was believed to have a 'China card'. By advertising his regime's willingness to cosy up to Beijing, it was argued, Nepal's other foreign partners – and especially Sinophobic India – would be scared into giving him an easy ride. Of course, it did not work out like that. Indian diplomats in fact like to boast of the "close dialogue" they maintained with China through Nepal's crisis earlier this year. The king played his China card but, as Rhoderick Chalmers of the International Crisis Group put it, "it turned out to be the two of clubs."

The episode is typical of the ambiguity and misunderstanding with which China is perceived in Southasia. Does emerging China represent a commercial opportunity or an economic threat? Are the smaller countries of the region to perceive Beijing as an ally against the overweening ambitions of the regional hegemon, or as New Delhi's 'strategic partner'? There are three main reasons for the uncertainty: that the relationship is in flux; that China is a closed society and its policymaking is opaque; and that it can be both opportunity and threat, friend and enemy at different times, or even simultaneously.

The central thread in all this is the China-India relationship, which is having an ever-bigger influence on Beijing's bilateral ties with every other Southasian country. Diplomatic relations between Delhi and Beijing are better than at any time since the war in 1962. China's president, Hu Jintao, will travel to India before the end of 2006. Whatever the other stops on his itinerary, the visit will reinforce the message that China has no higher priority in Southasia than improving its relations with India. Some Indians are rather carried away by this – they propose that this might be the dawn of a new era of partnership and cooperation, an 'India-China nexus' that will change the world.

There are strong grounds for scepticism. First, Indian suspicion about China run deep, and the disagreement that caused the 1962 war still looms large. Usually labelled a 'border dispute', it is not some minor cartographic tiff. The size of the Chinese-controlled territory India claims in Ladakh is as large as Switzerland. China's claim to what is now the state of Arunachal Pradesh covers an area three times larger. Since 1988, working groups have been discussing the dispute. Their main aim has not been to reach agreement so much as to shelve the issue, allowing relations to improve in other areas.