States often use their power of definition as a tool of political control. For the legatees of the British Empire in New Delhi, the territory beyond the Siliguri corridor (or the Chicken's Neck) is an area where a Military Assisted Civic Administration (MACA) is a necessary condition to keep the 'unity and integrity of the union' intact. In the Northeast – an extrusion of the mainland that may fall off if not kept connected with the force of arms – the military component has been an integral part of governance ever since British India and Tibet signed a border agreement on 3 July 1914, without the concurrence of the Chinese government.
The shadow of the northern empire began to appear even more menacing after skirmishes over the McMahon Line in the eastern Himalaya in 1962, resulting in the humiliation of the rulers in New Delhi. After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the issue of 'cartographic hostility' from the north was compounded by 'demographic aggression' from territory abutting the Bay of Bengal. Over fifty armed groups in the Northeast may have no agenda other than identity, self-advancement and self-respect. But for the establishment in New Delhi, they are all insurgents who must be either eliminated or kept under tight control. Ironically, such an approach confers legitimacy by default upon groups that seek to establish alternative – 'ours, not theirs' – authority. Insurgents and the establishment thus feed off each other in an area that has remained mired in political violence ever since Independence.
In the heyday of British and French colonialism, rebellions, revolts and mutinies were ruthlessly crushed. The British used what Rudyard Kipling called the 'white man's burden' excuse to validate their control over the resources of distant lands. The French claimed that they were on a mission civilisatrice, or civilising message, of spreading their superior values of assimilation and egalitarianism. Ever since Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel submitted the report of the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities and Tribal and Excluded Areas to the Constituent Assembly in 1947, the imperial authorities in New Delhi have believed that they were doing the people of the Northeast a favour by saving them from internecine conflicts. Development has been another ruse used to increase the coverage and intensity of imperial intervention. An overwhelming presence and the use of coercive force in the periphery has invariably backed all activities conducted there by the Centre. In this new work, Sanjib Baruah seeks to explore whether such a strategy works, though without seriously questioning the very premise of the civilising mission.
A different country
The edited volume opens with an introduction by Baruah, the longtime Northeast scholar. Questioning the efficacy of the development fix – bribe the barbarians with trinkets – he suggests that the security mindset is a hindrance rather than a supportive feature for sustainable peace in the Northeast. The backdrop thus sketched, the first chapter seeks to estimate the costs of stalemated conflict. Ananya Vajpeyi notes the emergence of new forms of resentment against the "permanent regime of exception" created by the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. Vajpeyi's is an academic paper that hardly says anything new, but does succeed in putting issues of concern in perspective. Her bleak prognosis about the futility of resistance is backed by the experiences of the past; extrapolation, however, is fraught with risks in studying history and society. In another article, Bodhisattva Kar traces the history of policing in the provocatively titled "When Was the Postcolonial?" This is a question that developmentalists would do well to pay attention to.