As the 'mini-ministerial' negotiations broke down on 29 July, the future of both the World Trade Organisation (WTO)'s Doha Round of trade negotiations and the multilateral system of trade in general look more uncertain than ever. Meanwhile, elections in the US this fall and India next year seem set to prolong the negotiations even further. Conceived in November 2001 at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Qatar, the Doha Round has thus far been marked by minor breakthroughs and major breakdowns. The developments of late July, however, marked the most significant setback yet.
In the politically charged atmosphere of the Cold War, most countries in Southasia, like developing countries the world over, were split between the East and the West in their political alliances, while attempting to achieve rapid economic development and global redistribution of wealth. Moreover, during the 1960s, the challenges in international trade – economic integration with the rest of the world, and assistance in addressing their 'developmental concerns' – led them to seek justice under the shade of 'rules-based' multilateral institutions. But the WTO, established in 1995 (as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) to provide the legal basis for such rules of trade, has thus far failed to provide economic justice to its less-powerful member states.
The Doha Round had the distinct potential to benefit Southasia. This could have happened if these countries were provided substantial market access in developed countries, and allowed to protect sectors affected by import surges through the implementation of safeguard mechanisms. This was partly recognised through the Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 2001, which also acknowledged special treatment for developing countries to be an integral part of the negotiations. But what has been lacking over the past seven years has been the commitment of developed countries to fulfil their obligations to the Doha mandate.
Safeguarding and protectionism
From a technical perspective, concluding a deal at this year's Doha Round should have been much easier than in the past, as substantial ground-level progress had been by trade negotiators thus far. But when the mini-ministerial meeting in late July began, besides major differences on cuts to industrial tariffs and continued spending on trade-distorting farm subsidies (mainly by the US and EU), political conditions in some of the key countries had been unfavourable. The administration of George W Bush lacked a mandate to negotiate from the US Congress; France and other EU member states warned that EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson did not actually have the broad base of support that he was claiming; and even as the negotiations were taking place in Geneva, the Indian government was facing the parliamentary confidence vote over the US-India nuclear deal. In retrospect, the most astonishing thing about the mini-ministerial meet was not that it failed, but rather how close it came to striking a deal at all.