"Resources are not well-enough spent. We all see it and we should address it," Kai Eide, the UN Secretary-General's new Special Representative to Afghanistan, noted at a press conference in Kabul on 9 April. His remark reinforced what high-level officials had pointed out last year, and again underlined the deep rot within Afghanistan. While the initial focus following the ousting of the Taliban had been on the quantity of aid being received for reconstruction, development experts are now increasingly challenging its quality as well. This questioning has followed the mounting evidence of growing income disparities, impoverishment and non-inclusive growth strategies.
The concern is certainly not misplaced. Afghanistan has extremely low revenue generation, accounting for just 28 percent of government spending. An estimated 90 percent of all public expenditure in Afghanistan comes from international assistance, with over two-thirds delivered as 'external assistance' – ie, not channelled through the government. This makes it is crucial for observers to follow donor priorities, delivery mechanisms and monitoring. Yet, from the very beginning, donor spending (USD 15 billion delivered since 2001) has lacked acceptable levels of transparency, cohesion or coordination within the donor community itself, as well as adequate engagement with Afghan priorities.
Of course, previous criticism of spending levels continues to hold true. For all the talk of Western governments' commitment to Afghanistan's 'stability', there seems to be a different value placed on Afghanistan when it comes right down to it. In Bosnia and East Timor, their first two post-conflict years saw per-capita contributions of USD 679 and USD 233, respectively. Afghanistan, on the other hand, which had less undamaged infrastructure left in 2001 than either of those two countries, has received only USD 57 per capita. This has led critics to suggest that the international community has been trying to do "peace on the cheap".
The cost of this relative miserliness has showed itself in the administration of the little aid that was sanctioned. The 'result oriented' approach – focusing on numbers over holistic development – led to quick, cheap projects being executed with an eye on the donor requirements but without accountability to the recipients. Donors were happy as long as they could rattle off targets – so many schools, children, clinics, media outlets. The worry now has become that the quality of these 'results' remain a secondary concern.