The author of this new work, S M Mushrif, is a former inspector-general of police with a distinguished record, including having exposed the infamous scam carried out by Abdul Karim Telgi, who in 2006 was found guilty of a wide-ranging 'stamp paper' counterfeiting scheme that had netted him hundreds of billions of rupees. Now, Mushrif has turned his attention to the Sangh Parivar, whom he refers to as "Brahminists". The Sangh's earlier modus operandi, Mushrif writes, consisted of instigating Hindu-Muslim riots, but it has in recent years "decided to switch gears … to raising the bogey of Muslim terrorism". In this, the Sangh's members have allegedly been aided by the fact that they have infiltrated much of the Indian media and the Intelligence Bureau.
These arguments are illustrated by detailed analysis of several incidents of extremist (though not necessarily Hindutva) violence, ending with the 26 November 2008 Mumbai attacks. These sections are meticulous and, on the whole, convincing. For example, the Nanded bomb blast of April 2006, at the house of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) member Laxman Rajkondwar, which killed and injured members of both the RSS and Bajrang Dal, should have alerted the authorities to the bomb-making activities of these outfits. Moreover, maps of Muslim religious places, artificial beards, mobile phones fand other evidence seized from the suspects showed them to have perpetrated three attacks on mosques in Parbhani, Jalna and Purna, while planning another in Aurangabad.
Investigations showed that the RSS, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal had been conducting indoctrination and extremist training camps since 2000, and had been procuring explosives. Yet the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS), then headed by K P Raghuvanshi, failed to follow up or take action on these leads, instead proposing to drop charges against most of the accused on grounds of insufficient evidence. Public outrage led to the transfer of the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), but this agency only further diluted the charges – ultimately treating the Nanded blast as an isolated incident instead of connecting it to the Parbhani, Jalna and Purna blasts; deleting the charge of conspiracy, removing references to the Sangh Parivar, and dropping charges against still more of the accused.
A similar tale is told through analysis of the investigation of the first Malegaon blast, in September 2006, which killed over 30 and injured more than 300 – all Muslims. The Nasik District police investigating the case realised that the Bajrang Dal was among the possible perpetrators, given the group's record at the Parbhani, Jalna and Purna mosques. Nasik police officers were able to identify the shop from which the cycles used to plant the bombs had been bought, and released sketches of the two men who had bought them. They also probed telephone calls made before and after the blasts, and detained 20 people from a predominantly Hindu area. But at this point, the ATS, still under Raghuvanshi, stepped in, held a press conference saying that a Muslim organisation was responsible, and arrested nine Muslims on suspicion of involvement. Thereafter, just as the case was being handed over to the CBI, the ATS submitted a chargesheet in court. Finally, on 16 November 2009, after the accused had been incarcerated for three years, the CBI informed the Bombay High Court that there was no evidence against them. Mushrif suggests that the ATS had simply concocted the case.