A certain desperation for some signs of hope on Afghanistan has accorded a broad-based welcome to Barack Obama's new policy, which appears to contain the promise of wide-ranging changes. Closer scrutiny of the policy's white paper, however, calls for caution. Despite the multifaceted goals it endorses, implying a comprehensive approach, the policy prioritises a narrow military goal as the focus of US policy. Other elements of support to political processes and development may end up underwriting the military strategy on Afghanistan, an approach that would have serious consequences for the security and welfare of the Afghan population.
The new policy assembles a number of worthy aims, including its emphasis on good governance and a dramatic increase in civilian capacity of Afghans. At the same time, however, it also clearly states that the "core goal of the US must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan." These aims are no different from the initial goals of George W Bush's White House, which was widely criticised for its narrow and short-term military aims.
The new National Security Advisor James Jones is a former Marine, whose area of responsibility includes the military campaign in Afghanistan – an indication that the matter of 'security' may be restricted to a militaristic interpretation. Currently, the goal does not take into account the wider issue of the political stability of Afghanistan, and gives no centrality to the security of Afghan citizens, who face violence from multiple sources, not just from the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Afghans must hope to benefit from the limited areas of convergence between their interests and those of the US government and its allies, though past experience suggests that this is likely to yield mixed blessings at best.
In fact, evidence from the last seven years suggests that, in the pursuit of these limited aims, the US government will be willing to condone the use of predatory and violent commanders who 'deliver' on al-Qaeda and Taliban targets even while pursuing rapacious and undemocratic policies towards the Afghan population. The evidence also suggests that there will be a high degree of tolerance for 'collateral damage' – that euphemistic term for civilian casualties arising out of the use of excessive force and an over-reliance on air strikes. In 2008, a year when the international military forces reportedly changed their operating methods to minimise civilian casualties, the number of deaths from air strikes by international military forces rose by 72 percent over the previous year alone, with a 40 percent increase in the use of aerial munitions.