The nuclear nightmare has come true. Taunted, jeered, and threatened by BJP India until it could resist no more, Pakistan too has gone nuclear. Understandably, as of the time of this writing, joyous crowds are still dancing in Islamabad over its stunning response to Shakti '98. They, like the crowds which had celebrated in Delhi just a while ago, are quite oblivious to the real meaning of what has really happened. But as the nuclear cycle advances to the next notch, and harsh economic realities start to bite, the real gravity of the situation will inevitably sink in. Meanwhile the cabal of neo-fascists and RSS fanatics in Delhi the same that had planned the 11 May tests – is pondering its next move.
Let us face facts. Our world changed irreversibly and totally just three weeks ago; it is now a world where nuclear annihilation henceforth shall always be just around the corner. Generations to come – if they come – in both Pakistan and India will agonise over how it all really happened. But it is fruitless to ask for history to be undone. Instead pragmatism demands that we look towards what is next and delineate what needs to be done for mutual survival. With the primal, bestial, and instinctual responses of the two huge nations in the present state of strong arousal, the ongoing cycle of action and reaction desperately needs interruption. Unless moderated and cooled, this lethal competition has an obvious end point.
The immediate formulation of effective war-avoidance measures is crucial. This means devising a set of technically sound procedures and devices that will make difficult the un-authorised, unintentional, or accidental use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is highly probable that should nuclear war ever take place, it will not be by the conscious design of Pakistani and Indian leaders but, instead, through miscalculation or unintended use of the weapons in some form. These horrific possibilities will remain as long as nuclear weapons remain. But one can – and absolutely must – work towards reducing probabilities. Otherwise India and Pakistan may provide to the world the first proof of failure of nuclear deterrence.
Consider first the issue of launch authority. In Pakistan there already exists a nuclear coordinating authority consisting of the president, prime minister, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the chief of army staff, and the airforce and navy chiefs. In India there is certain to be a corresponding body. Among other things, one hopes that the rules for the two nuclear bodies have been written so that complete unanimity is required of all available members as a condition for launching a nuclear strike; the disagreement of even one member should be sufficient to halt a strike.