On 4 October 2002, King Gyanendra seized state power in violation of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal when he dismissed the elected government of Sher Bahadur Deuba and nominated Lokendra Bahadur Chand, leader of the royalist Rastriya Parjatantra Party (RPP) as prime minister. Caught unawares, the mainstream political parties could do nothing except belatedly condemn the king's rapidly unfolding actions. They were not even able to organise mass protest rallies against what was really a palace coup. From this failure of the main political parties to mobilise mass opinion against the rapidly unfolding new dispensation in Kathmandu, both the king and Maoist rebels presumed that the process of polarisation of the polity between themselves had been completed. Therefore, the political parties were ignored in the subsequent talks between the king's government and the Maoists.
On 29 January 2003 the nominated government and the Maoists agreed to a ceasefire. When there seemed to be a glimmer of peace on the horizon, the mainstream political formations forged an alliance at the end of March 2003. They jointly finalised an 18-point common minimum programme and launched a movement against the monarchic takeover. Since then, the power struggle in the country has acquired a tripartite character and the balance of forces in the polity has been such that a political settlement has not been reached and none seems to be in sight because the current bargaining positions are mutually incompatible. The royal palace, backed by the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), is looking to resume the role in the national polity that it enjoyed before the 1990 Constitution came into effect and circumscribed its power. The Maoists, by contrast, are adamant in their demand for the creation of a constituent assembly to draft a drastically revised constitution that does away with perceived anomalies in the relationship between state and society. In opposition to both these positions, the mainstream political parties are demanding a return to constitutional government through the restoration of the dissolved parliament or the creation of an all-party transitional government.
These irreconcilable demands have obstructed the peace process and provides little hope for a long-term truce between the two armed forces as well as the over-ground political parties. The possibilities of peace are being further eroded by the consolidation of military capability on both sides. The fighting strength of the RNA is being upgraded through aid from the USA, the UK and India, while the Maoists have been freely recruiting cadres in the countryside and replenishing their armoury. After three months of ceasefire starting end-January this year, the official regime and the rebel regime sat at the negotiating table in April after agreeing to a code of conduct. At the second round of talks, the government acceded to the Maoist demand of restricting the movement of the army to a five kilometre-radius from their barracks. While it has been reported that this concession had King Gyanendra's all-important sanction, the army denied that any such consensus had been arrived at. Following the army's refusal to submit to the five kilometre restriction, the nominated government of Prime Minister Chand collapsed in May since it had lost the confidence of one of the most crucial entities in the post-constitutional polity.
After the departure of the Chand government, the mainstream political parties were still hopeful of finding a meaningful role in the political process. If they had any expectations from the palace, however, these were clearly unjustified. The king studiously disregarded their claims and, instead, nominated Surya Bahadur Thapa (also of the Rastriya Parjatantra Party) as prime minister. This reconfirmed the suspicion of the mainstream political forces that the democratic rhetoric emanating from the palace was so much eye-wash and that the takeover of 4 October 2002 had not been a short-term fix for an immediate problem but an attempt at institutional consolidation and to recover past glory. The Maoists, who had hitherto deluded themselves into believing that they constituted the decisive factor in the prevailing equilibrium, also realised that the hopes they entertained of a share in state power had come to nothing. The negotiations could obviously go no further, but the ceasefire remained in force since the Maoists were constrained by public pressure and unfavourable circumstances to respect it.