The 1990s has seen an unprecedented modernisation offensive in Tibet, and an attempt to transform the ancient capital into a frontier boom-town. But how much say do Tibetans have in the future of their country?
When supreme leader Deng Xiaoping toured China's southern provinces in early 1992 and launched the now famous 'Spring Tide' initiative, it was a signal of the central leadership's vigorous support for liberal economic reforms. Since that time, many of China's southern and eastern provinces have experienced unprecedented economic growth, with the development of free enterprise and the emergence of domestic consumerism, fuelled both by foreign investment and greater internal mobility of capital and labour.
In the same period, party and government officials in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) unleashed a new 'Socialist Modernisation' programme that emphasised urban construction, improved infrastructure, and development of a market economy while maintaining the ongoing imperative to 'crush separatism' and ensure 'stability'. The now frequently cited 22-character guideline handed down from the Party Central Committee reads, "Seize the Opportunity, Deepen Reform, Open up Wider, Promote Development, Maintain Stability."
The grandiose language of the socialist planners can be hard to fathom, but TAR'S Deputy Party Secretary Raidi (Rakti in Tibetan), addressing cadres in the Tibetan capital in early 1994, spelled the policies out in clearer terms. In the Xizang Ribao of 2 August 1994, he described 'reform' as "linking Tibet's economic restructuring with the whole country", and 'stability' as "stepping up construction of contingents of troops stationed in Tibet, armed police, judicial, procuratorial and public security workers."