The ceasefire agreement between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), anounced by prime minister 1K Gujral on 24 July 1997, is more than four years old. The agreement promised to bring about a lasting political solution to this long-drawn-out conflict through unconditional dialogue at the highest political level to be conducted in a neutral country. A set of ground rules and modalities to implement them, finalized on 12 December 1997 and further revised on 13 January 2001, aimed to facilitate the negotiations on politically substantive issues that underlie the five decades' long war.
A number of basic questions occur even as we try to evaluate the agreement at the end of its four tumultuous years: What progress has the promise of dialogue made in this period? Is there sufficient transparency in the process? Have both the sides been observing the ground rules, in letter and spirit? Has the Ceasefire Monitoring Group, set up to supervise adherence to these ground rules and to investigate complaints of their violations, been functioning effectively? Has the ceasefire brought respite from the violence and unremitting harassments, that has been the Nagas' lot over the past 50 years? Do they feel sufficiently relieved to acquire a stake in its continuance?
A central problem of the ceasefire agreement was that it did not include revocation of draconian laws, such as the Assam Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1953, Nagaland Security Regulation, 1%2, Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, and Assam Disturbed Areas Act, 1955, which allow the security forces to violate fundamental rights with impunity on the pretext of countering insurgency. With such laws still in force the role of the army and the paramilitary during the operation of the ceasefire was never really clarified. Given that there was a civil administration functioning under normal constitutional law and a security administration operating under special laws, the subordination of the military to civil authority and the legal demarcation of respective roles was a precondition for the success of the ceasefire. This issue itself arose from the related question of the state government's role in a ceasefire agreement between the Union of India and an insurgent group in the state. How do its agencies go about their law and order functions without jeopardising the special terms of the agreement?
There were two other aspects of the situation crucial to the efficacy of the ceasefire. For one, the attitude of the other insurgent groups and factions involved in the long war with India, who have not been included in the agreement, is vital to the maintenance of peace. And to what extent are civil society organisations uncontaminated by the violence, involved in the process of finding a just peace? If the 1997 ceasefire was in limbo, it was precisely because the modalities of the agreement failed to address these fundamental issues.