The success or failure of SAARC in advancing regional cooperation is dependent upon the inescapable fact that it is an inter-governmental organization. Even within the areas of cooperation that have been agreed upon, it will be as effective as the member-governments desire it. In other words, the scope and pace of cooperation that the governments find conducive to their perceived interests will play the decisive role. The question then arises, to what extent the individual governments are sensitive to the expectations of the people about the initiative known as SAARC. How far have signals from the "non-official" SAARC process been able to goad governments in the direction of cooperation?
The second half of the first decade of the SAARC organisation witnessed some decidedly positive developments. First, SAARC acquired a fairly elaborate institutional infrastructure, and appeared to have achieved the resilience needed to survive recurrent setbacks that are a part of South Asian reality. The organisation has also developed the potential of a war-preventive and peace-facilitating forum. Second, progress towards the institutionalisation of democracy in several countries also helped SAARC. Third, nearly every country has introduced bold and basic reforms for economic liberalisation, success in which may also promote interdependence. Initialives on the economic front promise higher rates of growth, greater macro-economic stability, increased foreign direct investment, an expanding middle class, growing modernisation and fast access to the information revolution. All these indications are favorable for regionalism.
The prospects of stability, peace and cooperation, however, are far from deeply rooted, and the instabilities within and between countries continue to cloud prospects. The region is rife with endemic instability related to political, ethnic, communal, sectarian and other types of conflict. The sources of conflict are of ´structural´ nature, with their roots in history, geopolitics, economics and ecology. The same historical, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious values that bind the nations together also keep them apart. Progress in SAARC is also hostage to divergent political and security perceptions originating in the division of the Subcontinent and its subsequent fallout.
It is against this backdrop that the effectiveness of nonofficial initiatives for cooperation in South Asia have to be looked at. There are two main streams of non-official dialogue process that are at work in South Asia to complement the official SAARC process. The first is an informal process on the sidelines of the official events and agenda, while the second is the whole spectrum of initiatives outside it.