There has been an incredible outpouring of public and private emotion in Pakistan over the "detention" of the country's most prominent nuclear scientists, including the best-known among them Abdul Qadeer Khan, the 'father' of Pakistan's A-bomb. In a country where the mainstream political discourse has degene-rated to nothingness, it is ironic that the popularly advertised "leaking" of nuclear secrets to countries on the US State Depart-ment's most-hated list should incite such nationalistic fervour and impassioned accusations against the government.
In theory, the furore (which the sensationalist Urdu press has done its best to create) was understandable. The scientists were detained largely at the behest of the United States, and as with any other such "request" made in recent times, the autho-rities have paid little attention to even a potentially perceived need to make the initiative contingent on public, or at the very least, parliamentary approval. As a result, it has been easy for anyone and everyone to launch frontal attacks on the government. Need-less to say, over the past four years there is an increasing perception in Pakistan that the government has time and again sacrificed the needs and aspirations of the Pakistani people on the altar of US interests.
But in practice, the whole affair reflected the manner in which Pakistan's prominent political entities operate – inciting nationalist sentiment and exploiting long-standing and regressive state ideologies, and reinforcing such ideas in the popular consciousness even while the real concerns of people remain completely marginal and irrelevant to the mainstream discourse. The nuclear tests in 1998 were followed by much celebration and rejoicing in the country, no thanks to the 50 years of indoctrination that have led most Pakistanis to accept that the perceived threat of Indian domination mandates an extravagant military establishment, and logically, this establishment´s monopoly over fundamental decision-making.
The hype was short-lived, because the acute economic squeeze subsequently faced by ordinary Pakistanis highlighted the direct consequence of parochial national-ism in an unforgiving geo-political set-up. As such, since the October 1999 coup that brought General Pervez Musharraf to power, much of the military's sacred aura has been demystified, particularly after 9/11 and the resulting shifts in foreign policy that the military regime was forced to make under American pressure. In fact, the reason for the ordinary Pakistani directing his/her frustration and anger towards the military lies with the simultaneous increases in poverty and insecurity that have come about over the past four years. The economic shocks are a direct result of the military willingly accelerating the processes of corporatisation and large-scale liberalisation that has been imposed upon the country in varying degrees by the international donor community for over two decades. More accurately, it is the deterio-rating economic conditions for the majority of working Pakistanis coupled with the wild and ostentatious living of the military high-command and its groupies that has fomented anger and frustration.