Britain's Gurkha War: The invasion of Nepal, 1814-16
by John Pemble
Frontline Books, 2008
Thucydides begins his monumental History of the Peloponnesian War by saying that whatever the publicly declared reasons and complaints, the truest explanation was that "the growth of Athens's power and the fear this caused among the Spartans made war inevitable". Written nearly 2500 years ago, it is a fair judgement against which to assess the causes of innumerable wars since, including the one that took place between Britain and the Gorkha state of Nepal between 1814 and 1816.
In the 60-year period after 1742, when Prithvi Narayan Shah became its king, Gorkha's growth as a military and political power was phenomenal. War with China in 1792 arrested its westward expansion; but within a few weeks of Bhim Sen Thapa seizing power in Kathmandu, in 1804, the drive westward from Garhwal resumed, with even greater energy and success. Only the failure, after a three-year siege, to take Sansar Chand's massive fortress of Kangra denied Gorkha the possibility of seizing Kashmir, the greatest prize for which it strove.
The formidably efficient Gorkha war machine, coupled with its insatiable desire for conquest, was powered by the desire for land revenue, particularly that from the fertile and productive Tarai lands over which many of the hill rajas had control. More revenue sustained a bigger army, which in turn needed more land and more conquests. These stark linkages stemmed primarily from the fact that Gorkha was a military state. The nobility made up the bulk of the army leadership, and it was their loyalty to Gorkha and to the throne that ensured the throne of the loyalty of the army. In the most literal sense, therefore, political power rested on the army, and its loyalty had to be constantly cultivated.