Afghanistan's opium economy has been called the most serious problem facing the country today. President Hamid Karzai has long warned that either "we destroy the problem or it will destroy us," going as far to declare jihad against poppy cultivation in 2004. But almost a half-decade after his declaration of war against the poppy, Afghanistan's illicit drug trade continues to plague security, stability and state-building initiatives in the country. Of late, drug activity has particularly contributed to the violence generated in southern Afghanistan. In 2008, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) tallied 78 fatalities caused by mine explosions, gun attacks or suicide bombings against eradication teams and counternarcotics personnel, compared to just 19 such deaths in 2007. The trend of insurgents and criminals supporting or facilitating attacks against eradication personnel and government targets has continued in 2009. By mid-June, four suicide attacks targeting counternarcotics personnel and their headquarters in Helmand and Nimroz provinces had left 16 people dead and 55 wounded. Scores of other eradication personnel died in a series of roadside bomb attacks in Kandahar and Helmand.
Economic and social issues such as poverty and food insecurity, weak governance, corruption and protracted instability have long created the perfect environment in which the Afghan narcotics industry can flourish. Yet many are now suggesting that the second half of 2009 will be pivotal. With international attention focused on the rising tide of violence, this year's deployment of 17,000 additional American soldiers to southern Afghanistan is tasked with a dual responsibility: tackling the insurgency, and disrupting its financial connection with the illegal-drugs industry. Unfortunately, an overemphasis on combat operations and forced eradication measures remains at the forefront of this strategy, at the expense of meaningful alternative livelihood programmes. Implementing wide-scale eradication in the current unstable security climate could create an even more hostile and dangerous environment. The economic void created by the singularly focused eradication process has been shown to be severely damaging to rural livelihoods – increasing the poverty rate and sowing further anti-government sentiment. By creating an appealing environment for insurgents and criminals to thrive and multiply, such groups could, in turn, co-opt thousands of angry farmers and unemployed youth into their ranks.
The current counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan is exclusively funded by the international community, and implemented by the Afghan government. It follows an eight-fold approach, with a nationwide focus on public awareness, alternative livelihoods, law enforcement, criminal justice, eradication, institutional development, regional cooperation and demand reduction. But few successes can be attributed to this 'war on drugs', especially given the unprecedented annual records of opium production and endemic non-stop violence. UNODC estimated 8200 metric tonnes of opium was produced in 2007, and 7700 in 2008 – enough to feed the world's demand for heroin and illicit opiate-based drugs for more than four years.
No element of this approach is more controversial than that of eradication, argued by many economic and counternarcotics experts again that it improperly targets the most vulnerable members of the narcotics industry – poor rural farmers. Arguably, eradication does have some merit, but it should be implemented only after an acceptable level of governance and security is achieved, thus allowing for a more-efficient government intervention and the ability to provide the necessary economic and agricultural assistance following the eradication measures. Those in favour of eradication argue that targeting illicit crops helps to shatter the image of the 'protection' offered by criminal and insurgent groups, and that all poppy farmers are not necessarily poor – that a distinction between 'greedy vs needy' needs to be made during the planning of eradication operations. However, this analysis fails to recognise the inevitable discord when a fledgling government fails to provide viable alternatives to the overwhelming majority of subsistence farmers growing poppy.