The concept of devolution of powers to the grass-roots was floated under the Musharraf regime in late 1999. The framework for the devolution plan was placed before sections of the intelligentsia at the initiative of the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), a body made up of the President-General's hand picked appointees. Consultations with various influential constituencies of society — politicians, media and civil society — commenced soon thereafter. At the end of this process, the Local Government Ordinance 2001 was promulgated, which contemplated community participation mechanisms through multistage elections to multi-tiered local bodies. The new administrative reforms lead to the creation of three levels of local government: unions, tehsils and districts, a chain of new offices created mainly to facilitate "transparency" to and "participation" of the general public.
It is quite evident that the new system has not delivered what it promised. There are many reasons for the inefficient delivery of public service under this decentralised mechanism. The most important among these is the ambiguous rules of procedure that have been put in place. The local government system has created a fragile and weak relationship between the provincial and the district tiers. Responsibilities and functions are not clearly assigned though it attempts to administratively detach the district from the provincial government. By involving the central government in district administration, the plan ironically hits provincial autonomy by ensuring a constant tension between the federal and the provincial governments. The latter keeps complaining of shortfall of 'effective' powers of government while the former grumbles that their autonomy under the devolution plan is 'ineffective', thanks to their respective upper tiers. An example is the tension between Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) government and the district authorities, which was so serious that President Musharraf had to intervene personally to save the system from a possible collapse. Although, in letter, the devolution plan says that local governments shall work within the provincial framework, yet provinces feel that devolution has further reduced the already meagre level of autonomy that they were enjoying.
Functionally, persons exercising authority at the district-level now are unwilling to allow public participation in the decision-making. Differences of this kind — between elected representatives and executive officials — only add to the confusion. All decisions are being taken by the district, tehsil/town/union nazims, who are bypassing the elected councils, which are supposed to take up all important issues under the Local Government Ordinance. Due to the imprecise nature of the rules, tensions periodically crop up in the relations between the district nazims and District Coordination Officers (DCOs) and between nazims and District Police Officers (DPOs). Highhandedness on the part of the police also continues unabated, and the nazims feel helpless to help alleviate the police-related problems of the people. The elected councillors, on the other hand, have been complaining that their proposals or even suggestions in most matters, including the process of budget-making, which is undertaken by another part of the bureaucracy at the district-level, are not given any importance. In most districts, the system has come to a standstill. It would not be an exaggeration to say that things are running on an ad hoc basis.
Whither democracy?
Even the 'democratic' component of these arrangements is suspect. The elections are to be held in a 'party less' atmosphere, with only vetted and "morally sound" candidates being allowed to contest, while those with declared party affiliations are debarred. This paternalistic formula is mired in controversy. Further, though it is believed that the devolution process has reduced the absolute powers that the civil bureaucracy enjoyed under the previous system, the tensions between nazims and the district officers looking after various departments, has increased. This is due to the fact that the latter are recruited by provincial governments and the districts have no say in their hiring and firing. The fact that some officials with chronic 'bad' reputation are still serving in the district governments only adds to the tension. If the reform was motivated by the need to introduce system-level changes, to overcome systemic inefficiencies and inadequacies, the process has been neutralised by the inability to foster 'responsible' behaviour among officiating individuals. Will a change in the administrative apparatus make any difference if the people at the helms of affairs are not sincere enough to make things happen? The NRB has failed to bring about a change in the attitude of the persons involved in the provision of services to the people under the new system.