Attempting to describe the scale and impact of the current flooding in Pakistan is no more possible than trying to describe the colours of a butterfly's wing to a blind man. This is a calamity that will touch – either directly or indirectly – every man, woman and child in the country; and touch them not only in the here-and-now but for generations to come. As Himal goes to press, the disaster is still unfolding, and there is still no clear picture of what the final toll will be in human or material terms. The magnitude of the disaster prompted UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to urge member countries to speed up aid, and on 11 August he launched an appeal for USD 460 million to feed people for 90 days. After the initial slow response, the international community has now 'stepped up aid for flood victims and by 18 August, the United Nations had been given USD 227.8 million, representing 49.6 percent of total requirements,' according to the UN Information Centre spokesperson in Islamabad, Ishrat Rizvi. (By 23 August, the UN had received USD 490.7 million.)
First off, it is important to note that no country on Earth could have responded appropriately to the cataclysm that started in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (the former NWFP) and subsequently made its way down the Indus river system in Punjab and Sindh, inundating parts of Balochistan along the way. It would not have been possible to ensure an appropriate level of preparedness, because the immensity of the inundation and the power of the waters were beyond any planning model. To have responded appropriately to a once-in-a-century flood would have required the pre-placement of resources beyond the capacity of the state. Pakistan has done what any state faced with a similar emergency would have done – the best it can with what it has. Does that fall short? Unfortunately, yes – by a long shot.
Relief operations currently have been a mixture of tightly controlled and coordinated aid programmes, and local self-help, individual or small-group initiatives. International NGOs all have their own disaster plans. In Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, there is a long institutional memory of providing for the needs of refugees and displaced persons on a large scale, leaving the provincial government probably the best equipped to cope.
Aid distribution has been haphazard in many places, particularly where the local administration broke down due to the floods and district coordination officers had no control over information mechanisms or resources. In terms of preparedness, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was aware of the weather forecast, mentioning the probability of a 10 percent increase in monsoon rainfall, but little is known about what it did to prepare for this. Even if it had done its utmost, however, it would not have been possible to accurately predict the magnitude of the deluge. The best that can be said for the NDMA is that it has been doing its best; but had it not been for the military, flood relief would have been very patchy indeed. The Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force have all been involved in relief work, heavily augmented by US helicopters in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh. In the current phase of emergency response, helicopters, amphibious vehicles and boats have been the key vehicles – and there have not been enough of any of them.