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Prospecting the treasure house

When Beijing heralded the opening of the new Qinghai-Lhasa train line in early July last year, Tibetans, environmentalists and human-rights activists across the globe worried in anticipation of the hoards of Han Chinese – tourists and settlers alike – that would now be able to flood onto the 'roof of the world'. When the project was originally announced in 2001, the Dharamsala government-in-exile dubbed it a "disaster", for reasons of both population influx and environmental damage. With around 4000 passengers now riding the rails every day (in 1980, a fourth that number of tourists visited during the whole year), those worries may indeed prove warranted.

But in fact, just as much emphasis should probably have been placed on what the new 1965 km-long train tracks would be able to ship out. In mid-February, Beijing published a report announcing the 'discovery' of an estimated USD 128 billion worth of minerals in more than 600 sites in Tibet – a result of a seven-year programme by more than a thousand surveyors to geologically map the plateau. Their findings are large enough to astound: a billion tonnes of iron ore, 40 million tonnes each of lead and copper. Such a backyard stockpile would be a huge shot in the arm for the Chinese economy, which has struggled increasingly in recent years to keep up with domestic demand for raw minerals in the face of steeply rising international prices.

If the finds are as large as Beijing reports, they would double China's current stores of lead, copper and zinc. Tibet's mineral wealth seems to now justify the alluring traditional Chinese name for central Tibet – Xizang, roughly translating to 'Western Treasure House'. In the past, the focus has been on Tibet's oil reserves, which in 2005 were estimated at roughly 10 billion tonnes – a tantalising lode for the world's second-largest oil importer. But oil production in Tibet has remained low, in part because Western oil companies – including Shell and BP – have faced harsh public criticism in the West for any involvement.

It is not clear how quickly Beijing will move from prospecting to extraction of Tibet's ores; at present, less than one percent of the discovered mining spots has been explored. The fact is that there simply has not been the infrastructure required to move raw products out of the Tibetan hinterland in any kind of large-scale process. While there are now two major pipeline projects working to bring Tibetan oil to mainland China, construction on these only got underway in 2000 and 2002. Mineral transport, of course, is even more difficult an undertaking.