As SAARC leaders gather for their 15th Summit in Sri Lanka, it is timely to reflect on how far we have come in realising the vision of SAARC's founders, and where we may have fallen short. Judging by the number of committees and commissions; technical, ministerial and even summit meetings held; as well as reports, resolutions and agreements adopted, SAARC certainly appears to be alive and kicking. But at the popular level, SAARC's existence has not done much to inculcate a feeling of Southasian-ness on the part of the citizens of its member states.
Objectively, we know that there are many commonalities among us Southasians. Most of us share a cultural heritage, enjoy Bollywood films, savour spicy cuisine. We also face common development challenges – ranging from the world's highest levels of malnutrition, degrading poverty, deplorable sanitary conditions and shamefully low status of women. On the positive side, lately we are also beginning to see economic dynamism in some parts of the region, a popular craving for democracy and human rights, and people embracing globalisation with a vengeance, ahead of their governments. But it is rare to see Southasians acting as a group, with a sense of solidarity to overcome their distress or to capitalise on their opportunities. It is as if we are Southasians by origin, but are non-aligned in our behaviour vis-à-vis each other.
Due to the disproportionate size and influence of India compared to other countries of SAARC, most politically active citizens of other countries tend to harbour a deep – often exaggerated – fear and resentment of India. It is common to hear people from Colombo to Kathmandu, Kabul to Comilla, Male to Multan whining about an 'Indian conspiracy', often with fanciful imagery. Outside the Subcontinent, one often finds Bangladeshis and Nepalis, Pakistanis and Sri Lankans more concerned about not being identified as Indians than about being seen as Southasians. Everywhere in the world, the desire for separate identities is more pronounced among citizens of smaller countries and communities; suspicion of powerful neighbours is certainly not unique to Southasia. Nor are such feelings easily remediable. To address this matter, it would probably be in India's and everybody else's best interest for New Delhi to make extra non-reciprocal efforts to demonstrate its magnanimity – with humility – through some form of sophisticated Gujral Doctrine.
Other than publications by the SAARC Secretariat itself, I am only aware of only two region-wide publications of note in the entire SAARC region, one being the South Asia Human Development Report and the other being Himal Southasian. One can find Southasian Studies programmes in several universities in North America and Europe, but I am unaware of any such programmes in universities of the SAARC countries. Likewise, at the United Nations, Southasians rarely act as a group. Unlike Africans, Arabs or Latin Americans, Southasians rarely put up a common position on key policy issues as one might expect, or propose common candidates for senior UN positions. On the contrary, I am aware of several instances in which Southasians have undercut each other by proposing multiple national candidates. Whatever Southasians do as a group at the United Nations or elsewhere tends to be symbolic, ceremonial or formalistic, and rarely strategic.