Three years ago, on the back of the election of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, there was a subtle but perceptible change in India's regional policy. This shift went largely unnoticed in the Delhi media, but had the potential to change the relationship of Southasia's largest power with the rest of the region. Based on the country's high economic growth figures, enjoying a cushioned seat in capitals worldwide, while vying for increased say in the United Nations and with an economist prime minister as the head of government, the conservative mandarins at South Block suddenly seemed to become significantly more confident.
First and foremost, New Delhi's foreign policies gained a notable level of coherence. The vision of a stable neighbourhood being in India's long-term interest gained acceptance. Shyam Saran and his successor as foreign secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, both appeared to be reasonable liberals, who realised that a burning neighbourhood does little to help access India's global aspirations. There was likewise hope that India's dirty-tricks department, the intelligence agencies, would stop playing games that heighten disturbances in Kathmandu, Colombo, Dhaka and Islamabad.
By now, it is evident that Southasia is anything but stable, and is instead facing multiple and escalating crises. It is worth evaluating, after three years of UPA policymaking, what India's role in Southasia has been. Has the Alliance, and South Block as its implementer, lived up to the promise of working towards a 'peaceful periphery', or was this only a feel-good principle meant for consumption by an at-times gullible media?
To give credit where it is due, Indian actions did show that there was a concerted effort to jettison the zero-sum mindset vis-à-vis the neighbours. India pushed the peace process with Pakistan. While it may have dragged its feet on Kashmir, domestic instability within Pakistan is currently the key obstacle to a more cordial bilateral relationship, with the peace process at the moment seeming like an almost forgotten chapter. Even in the unlikely event that involvement is sought, India can do little to help Pakistan deal with its democracy deficit and Islamic militancy of the recent past, made more complicated by US intervention in the country. At best, it can help Pakistanis help themselves by being supportive of the democratisation process and a civilian-military partnership, and by maintaining peace on the Kashmir front.