On 4 January, Punjab province Governor Salman Taseer was killed by a member of his security detail, Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri. But as disturbing as the assassination itself were the circumstances surrounding and following the governor's death, as outlined in articles in this issue of Himal by Husain Naqi and Iqbal Khattak. In the aftermath, the hold of Pakistan's religious lobbies has proven to be so powerful that no mullah, not even one appointed and paid by the state, was willing to conduct his funeral rites. While progressive civil-society voices have condemned both the incident and the direction in which Pakistan is heading – an act of great courage in these times – they remain a desperately small minority.
The entire incident epitomises the very real existential crisis in which the Pakistani nation now finds itself – one that relates to its very identity. Successive governments in the country have been quiescent before the forces of religious fundamentalism, and over the years brought in legislation to appease the religio-political forces – including the blasphemy laws that have been under such scrutiny of late. Today, this has reached a situation in which the country's religious minorities (constituting less than five percent of the national population) are beleaguered amidst a legal system that denies them basic human rights. In turn, this has enabled fundamentalist ideologies to take firm hold in the minds of government functionaries. The support of the state and its security agencies, including sections of the armed forces, to such sections has now reached a point where they are becoming a threat to the very existence of the Pakistani state itself – at least, in the form we know it.
The ruling coalition in Islamabad, led by the secular-liberal Pakistan People's Party (PPP), finds itself in an intractable situation. While it has termed Taseer's assassination a political conspiracy, it is wary of openly challenging the blasphemy law. The PPP remains haunted by the 1977 movement against then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which led to General Zia ul-Haq's infamous coup. That year, the religious right was a vocal minority; but in the Pakistan of 2011 it is very influential, having penetrated almost every institution of the state and society. Most importantly, the proliferation of jihadi groups during the past decade has made matters worse, as the religious parties now have allies who are armed and willing to die for the 'cause'.
As noted, the successive civil and military rulers of Pakistan have been jointly responsible for appeasing the religious lobbies. Worse, Pakistan's foreign policy, especially its India-centric worldview, has entailed using the religious lobby as a strategic lever against India in the east and, of late, against the US in the west. Given that national-security policy is still being driven by Pakistan's all-powerful armed forces, a weak civilian government can do little to bring about meaningful change.