When speaking of any society, it is necessary to ask how far into the grassroots the reach of chauvinistic, exclusionary ultra-nationalism stretches. This is an important question, because it is the people at the mass level who define the political direction of any country. If ultra-nationalist populism has the masses in its grip, it constricts the manoeuvring ability of the politicians who might know better, and allows the demagogue to take politics to the ultra-left or ultra-right.
While 'soft' nationalism, in itself, is a fine thing, providing for a comforting – secular, cultural – identity, it can become dangerous if radicalised and used by the capital-based establishment to entrench itself against competing forces within a nation state. Such a situation promotes the centralisation of the state apparatus, and fosters a military mindset. It is at this point that histories and textbooks are rewritten to serve the interests of the central elite establishment – and an ultra-nationalism is born that, in turn, waters the soil of chauvinism. Neighbouring countries as well as those farther afield are seen with a suspicion that is largely undeserved, and a conspiracy-seeking sensibility invades our consciousness.
Within Southasia, the national establishment in each country manipulates the masses, both directly and subtly, to support forms of ultra-nationalism that ultimately help to keep them in power. This strategy continues to be used even as ultra-nationalism often goes against the interests of the people who would be supported by a non-chauvinist, cultural nationalism, which could actually help to promote good-neighbourliness. What the people at large, and especially those who live in Southasia's 'arc of poverty' – from Khulna to Bihar and from the Nepal Tarai to Sindh – need is peace, trade, open borders and visa-less travel. What the capital-based elites desire are closed or regulated borders, barbed wire and expenditure on armed forces, if not nuclear weaponry. In their individual ultra-nationalism, the capital elites of Southasia are blood brothers, and together they make our region the most militarised in the world.
One would think that the masses would have so little to gain from issues that agitate the capital-based establishment classes that ultra-nationalism would have little chance in the rural sphere. One would think that the villager in Sindh or deep inside Andhra Pradesh would have a more flexible attitude towards, say, the question of Kashmir. But this is not the case. True, on the whole the average villager does not spend time thinking about grave issues of national security. Even so, at the level of articulation, ultra-nationalism appears to have sunk roots there too.