The number of independently nuclear states in Asia has risen to four. Though the increment to the total nuclear capacity on the continent is marginal, the potential for a nuclear catastrophe remains high. The current destructive capacity of India and Pakistan is admittedly limited. But the permanent state of friction between the two countries, arising from the protracted dispute over Kashmir, increases the possibility of any one of the recurring conventional conflicts escalating into nuclear revanchism. Given the high density of subcontinental population, particularly in the large metropolises of both countries, even these two limited kiloton arsenals can unleash extraordinary havoc.
Polities built on hyper-real security anxieties deliberately shun mechanisms for verifying the popular consent for measures that purport to be in the interest of national defence. Consequently, through intermediary agents in the political, academic and information arenas, the belief is orchestrated that the nuclear talisman will exorcise its own nihilistic spectres. This conviction of the security establishment is deemed for all practical purposes to represent a national consensus. Rodham Narasimha, a leading exponent of India's current policy, claimed that the committee that prepared the Draft Nuclear Policy was composed of a broad crosssection of views and hence represented a national consensus. Since a consensus predisposed to policies already decided is forged by stealth in select committees, it is also simultaneously necessary to obstruct any discordant public campaign that disputes the legitimacy and rationale of the simulated consensus.
Through a process, eloquently described by the eminent historian and peace campaigner, EP Thompson, critics of this putative consensus are consigned to a recalcitrant, lunatic fringe that supposedly does not appreciate the gravitas of state. The police, the press, both 'sophisticated' and scurrilous, political parties, scientific luminaries and strategic analysts are commandeered to certify the imprudence of the dissenters and the illegitimacy of their belief, even if they are otherwise people of professional eminence and distinction. This is the state-inspired environment of hostility that confronts the incipient anti-nuclear movement in South Asia.
An obvious aspect of the current South Asian reality is that potential weapon-level nuclearisation is a very recent development. Inevitably, the movement against it is embryonic, more sporadic than continuous, and has yet to secure for itself a large enough domestic constituency to attain the critical mass that could even minimally inhibit nuclear gusto, let alone determine positive policy outcomes in its favour. By contrast, reflecting the long history of nuclear escalation in the NATO countries, the nuclear disarmament campaign has been tempered by more than fifty years of experience.