In the run-up to the December Copenhagen conference, the question of whether a unified Southasian vision on climate change can help the region's countries be part of the effort to stabilise greenhouse gases and adapt to changing climate is a critical one. A unified front would offer a number of clear advantages. First, the weak bargaining position of most of the Southasian countries is well known. Climate negotiations are complex and unwieldy, with the consensus rule of the UN's Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) requiring serious diplomatic prowess to reach any acceptable resolution. As such, with resources pooled under a single platform, the Southasian states would almost certainly be able to get a better climate deal at Copenhagen than otherwise.
All the same, will the negotiated Southasian stance be something that will actually advance the interests of all the countries of the region? Such a mutually beneficial platform would require either that India make major concessions by accepting emission cuts, or that other countries agree with New Delhi and refuse to make binding emission cuts. In this sense, a common Southasian front does not seem a necessity if the sole goal of the individual countries is to obtain a better deal in Copenhagen. Indeed, there are other ways in which the objectives of the individual countries can be met. Most Southasian countries are either members of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) group or of the G7 plus China, two forums that have proven far more effective than SAARC in achieving tangible outcomes at international negotiations. LDCs – though at the cost of stalling the Doha Round, have been effective in pushing their agenda on agricultural goods at the World Trade Organisation. SAARC, on the other hand, has been held hostage to regional tensions, with little progress made on the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) and other fronts where cooperation has been agreed upon.
In this context, letting India take the lead in climate negotiations – which would be a given if a common platform were developed – might not be the best option for all of Southasia. In fact, it could well be a step in the wrong direction. Other Southasian countries simply cannot take a wait-and-see approach, allowing India to 'develop' for a few decades before emissions start coming down. Furthermore, the paranoia with which other countries in the region look at New Delhi's leadership is something that cannot be dismissed. At the moment, India simply does not have the credibility or goodwill of many of the other countries of the region.
Yet even if a Southasian front is not likely to be fruitful during negotiations, the very imminent problems caused by climate change will definitely require a regional response. Livelihoods hinge on natural systems and their predictability. The shockwaves that went across the Subcontinent when the monsoons did not arrive on time this year is a potent example of how Southasia hangs on the precarious balance of nature for its well being. Climate change itself is going to act as a major stressor, and pose an additional, massive hurdle to development. The existence of such problems clearly provides ground for cooperation, though also for increased competition. After all, it remains a matter of merely when and at what scale these problems will begin to emerge. Unless there is recognition of the fact that these countries are tied together, the already-existing tensions will only be aggravated, and an amicable solution will remain a distant thing.