The passage of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, in mid-April, has been hailed as a major milestone on the country's journey towards greater democratisation. It has come about as Pakistan passes through a very delicate – and bumpy – transition from military to civilian governance. Admittedly, there have been numerous such transitions in the country's past, but these have always been scuttled before they could reach any advanced stage. Nonetheless, today there is cautious optimism on display. One reason for this is a growing realisation that, this time around, political leaders are specifically trying not to repeat the mistakes of the acrimonious past.
It was the vendetta-based politics of the 1990s that led to the military playing the role of umpire between the political parties. In the latest instance, the military threw out the whole lot in 1999, plunging Pakistan once again into another era of 'controlled democracy'. Today, a chastened political class is far more mindful of what is at stake if its performance (or lack thereof) once again begins to erode public confidence. As such, the politicians are at least making the right sounds, though their actions and petty politicking leave much to be desired. Two years have passed since the democratically elected government was sworn in, a period that has seen some ups and many downs. It may still be too early to assess the success or failure of this latest transition, but some trends have emerged from within the hazy political backdrop.
Pakistan was born as a federation, with the four provinces broadly defined in ethnic and linguistic terms. However, the Centre – exemplified by the civil and military bureaucracy – had a dominating role, though one opposed by the provinces, which continued pushing for greater devolution of power. At one time or the other, the sub-national forces in the smaller provinces of Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP (now renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwah) nurtured rebellious tendencies, and often even movements. The separation of East Pakistan in 1971 was a bitter manifestation of these forces at work. Calls for greater provincial autonomy are as old as Pakistan itself, and indeed have become louder in recent years. All this time, however, such calls have fallen on near-deaf ears; the iron grip of the Centre has not eased.
This 'control freak' nature of the Pakistani state is rooted in numerous insecurities of the past. The existential threat from India – real or perceived – has weighed heavily on the state, although it does so to a lesser extent now. Fears of India fanning separatism in Sindh and Balochistan, and Afghanistan's continuing disagreement over recognition of the Durand Line, have also dominated the state's thinking. Such fears solidified the perception that if the provinces were given more powers, they might break away. Some might see scant reason for such anxieties, but the break-up of 1971 left many with no need for any substantiation. Somehow, the fact that it was the state's refusal to devolve powers that constituted a major cause of the debacle did little to change this mentality. The civilian bureaucracy, military establishment and ruling Punjabi elite have traditionally been the flag-bearers of a strong Centre. This is not surprising, given that all three have controlled the Centre and dominated all major policymaking; yet Pakistan has paid heavily for this 'father-knows-best' attitude.