It has been eight years since General Pervez Musharraf first woke up to the need for political legitimacy to bolster his military rule. It turns out that he need not have worried, what with the history of America's support for military dictators in Pakistan, and the 'war on terror' raging along the northern border. While that alone was enough to keep him entrenched in power as Pakistan descended into the maw of extremism and internal conflict, there was always the mild irritant of the need to 'return to democracy'.
Gen Musharraf nonetheless remains the West's (read: the US) "best option" in a nuclear Pakistan besieged by extremists, even as at home he is largely viewed as an American stooge. His ratings have hit rock-bottom in the wake of a series of difficulties: military operations in the restive tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, suppression of the insurgency in Balochistan with bombs, a spate of suicide bombings (38 in the first nine months of this year, killing more than 350), and constitutional and judicial crises erupting from increasingly desperate bids to cling to power.
Against the backdrop of the presidential and parliamentary elections currently slated for early October, the general's choices of ways to stay in command have shrunk to a single option: seek reconciliation with popular political forces, something he was loathe to do all along. But to do this, Gen Musharraf has to allow concessions that would considerably weaken his position vis-à-vis the political opposition. The alternatives – to fall back on the unpopular ruling party that opinion polls say will be routed in the upcoming elections, or to impose a state of emergency or martial law – would only bring him face to face with the nightmare of illegitimacy once again. In a country riding high on judicial and media activism, and fed up with the insecurity that comes with fighting someone else's war, no referendum is going to keep Gen Musharraf afloat this time. Nor, for that matter, will a state of emergency or martial law quiet the media or lock up the judiciary. It is not much fun being Pervez Musharraf these days.
Following the 2002 elections, the two-thirds majority that Gen Musharraf needed to amend the Constitution was readily provided by a combination of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Q), comprised largely of defectors from Nawaz Sharif's party, and the religious parties. This allowed the general to stay simultaneously as president and chief of army staff – until now. Gen Musharraf's dual role has been particularly helpful to the US's push for a security agenda in the region following the attacks of 11 September 2001.