After spending more than a quarter-century in the profession, 15 June 2006 taught this writer one of the cardinal principles of journalism: a reporter should never postpone a story hoping to give good news. After having repeatedly extending the deadline for this article in the hope that the international facilitators would somehow persuade the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to abandon their intransigence and seriously take up the path of negotiation, there is now no ceasefire, no peace process, and the worst fear of many has become a reality.
The fourth Eelam war began early on the morning of 15 June. A powerful land mine ripped through a bus packed with commuters and schoolchildren in the northern Sri Lankan village of Kebettigollawa, killing 68 people and wounding as many more. The explosion was the worst single act of violence since the government and LTTE rebels signed a Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in 2002. For days afterwards, Sri Lanka's military responded by bombing rebel-held areas in the northeast, including a Catholic church in which 200 people were taking refuge.
Other than the extraordinary loss of innocent life, the tragedies that 15 June signified are many. One, the peace constituency in Sri Lanka clearly had failed to explain the gains of four years of ceasefire, or the peace dividends it had brought to the country in general and to the south in particular. Two, while much was written to explain the difference between no war and enduring peace, there was a systematic effort by both the Tamil Tigers and the government to scuttle the peace process by strengthening antagonistic views of each other. Three, both futilely tried to play the India card. Four, the limitations of any third-party mediation in an entrenched conflict situation have become clear. Despite the vigorous efforts by the facilitator Norway — as well as the other co-chairs of the peace process, Japan, the US and the EU — the process was unable to move forward due to a simple lack of consensus between the two major political groupings in the south. Five, though both the LTTE and the Colombo government are well aware of the futility of war and the military stalemate it would produce, there was a suicidal desire to shore-up military might and be seen as tough players both at the cost of the people.
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