After 22 years of military rule without a constitution, the Burmese state is gearing up to hold a parliamentary general election later this year. There has been little doubt that these polls would be highly managed by the junta government, but the final indicator of this came in late March, when the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) decided not to re-register the party to take part in the election. The decision will end the party's existence as a legal entity on 7 May, following the end of a stipulated 60-day registration period. Little is publicly known of the exact reasoning behind the party's decision, beyond a 6 April press release. This stated that the party had concluded that it would not re-register due to the recently unveiled election laws, which it termed "unfair and unjust". Among the new election regulations is the Political Parties Registration Law, which bars from the electoral process the more than 2000 political prisoners languishing in Burmese jails. These include the country's key democratic leadership, such as the head of the NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as ethnic Shan leader Khun Htun Oo and student leader Min Ko Naing. Yet in this context it is important to note that during the past 20 years, not a single one of the NLD's political goals have been met – political dialogue with the military for national reconciliation, honouring the 1990 election result, the release of all political prisoners, withdrawing the military from politics, etc. If this cumulative failure is behind the party's boycott decision, a firm adherence to the political integrity of the NLD leadership, particularly Suu Kyi, has led to the party's demise, at least for now.
Whether this decision is strategically sound has become a contentious issue among NLD supporters and members alike, and debates have erupted within what is generally a fairly restrained membership. The disappearance from politics of the NLD – a party that was founded during the 1988 people's movement, and whose members have carried high the flag of democracy since then – would clearly be a great loss, particularly given its record of maintaining both its strength and unity without major divisions during the past two decades. With the impending exit of the NLD, the political scene is already shifting to newly registered parties in the pre-election period. Even so, the absence of the NLD from the ballot will make the electoral exercise far less credible. In addition, the polls will almost certainly not improve Burma's relations with the regional and international community, and the sanctions imposed by the US and EU will remain in place.
In the post-election political scenario, should the NLD somehow reconstitute itself as some type of organised or ad hoc movement, it will find itself dealing with a new parliament and government, not just the military junta. In this scenario, the NLD would have to deal with the new multi-party parliament, which, due to military pressure, could make the NLD irrelevant by opposing its activities. Second, the military could easily manipulate the new legislature body in the absence of a strong opposition party. By the time Suu Kyi is released – an event currently slated for November – the election exercise will have been completed. But in contrast to her situation during previous releases, she will have no official party platform from which to conduct her political affairs.
Though the NLD has not publicly revealed its plans to date, there is little doubt that the democratic movement will continue in some form under Suu Kyi's leadership. It is, however, far from certain whether the movement will be able to maintain the support of the people in a situation in which they can only initiate political and social movements at the grassroots level. As things stand in Burma, it is near impossible to form and operate an association, social or political, without registration. And this barrier will undoubtedly remain in place, given that to date no existing law has been repealed. Following the election, the new government could well bar all groups outside the legal framework from undertaking political activities, arguing that ruling and opposition parties already exist in parliament.