The present situation in Nepal is characterised by a paradox. The king has acknowledged the sovereignty of the people. The Maoists have proclaimed their commitment to a peaceful solution through the political process. The army has declared its loyalty to democratic forces. There is a broad consensus on the ultimate goals of society and state – sovereignty of the people; multiparty democracy, inclusive of all people, communities and regions; gender-equity; recognition of cultural diversity; rights for all, including minorities; social justice and the rule of law. All of these constitute a compelling vision of Nepal. Compared to many other countries that have suffered internal conflicts, Nepal is extremely well-placed to consolidate progress towards these goals.
The Seven Party Alliance (SPA), the Maoists, and the general public are agreed that the new constitutional and political order will be established through a constituent assembly (CA), composed on the principle of inclusiveness. The state would be restructured in a progressive manner through the constituent assembly, "resolving all problems including those related to class, caste, region and gender". Meanwhile, there would be an interim constitution to ensure democracy, peace and human rights. It would provide the basis for an interim government. The House of Representatives would be dissolved and replaced by alternative arrangements made through consensus. People's governments of the Maoists would be dissolved. Decisions on important national issues would be made through dialogue and consensus. The interim constitution would also specify the procedure for the convening and operation of the constituent assembly, including public participation through free and fair elections ("without any fear or threats and without being influenced by violence").
The paradox lies in the fact that despite agreement on the ultimate goals and this seemingly straightforward roadmap, hurdles have appeared as to its implementation. Difficulties arise in part from the ambitious scope of the interim constitution draft, which nevertheless leaves several critical and controversial issues to be resolved by the SPA and the Maoists. These include the nature of the state, the mode of election of the constituent assembly, and the composition of the interim legislature. It does not sufficiently address the problems of governance in the transitional period. In part, these difficulties arise from differences over the 'management of weapons' – particularly the Maoist arms – and from questions as to the conditions under which the Maoists can enter government and under which elections to the constituent assembly can legitimately be held
There are considerable risks and dangers if the stalemate is not speedily resolved. Sectarian interests will seek dominance over the national interest; parties will increasingly position themselves for the future, rather than try to solve present-day problems of transition; and there may be a reversion to the earlier conflict. Frustration will mount, and there will be further disillusionment with the political parties.