In its tenth year, the Maoist rebellion in Nepal has not become any less complex. Its analysis requires not just an understanding of the historical evolution of conflict in Nepal, the nature of conflict in Southasia and, in particular, the southern watershed of the Himalaya. All of this must also be done against the backdrop of Maoist rebellion in other countries and continents. On the political side, there are three layers that must be analysed: the left-democratic movement of Nepal, the Maobaadi activities in the context of international and Southasian politics, and the international communist movement. Neither can we study the Maoist phenomenon in the absence of an understanding of caste-ethnic inter-linkages in the Himalayan midhills, the specificities of the Nepali economy, and the attempts of Nepali feudalism to countenance globalisation. Finally, the respective national security preoccupations of Maha-Bharat and Maha-Chin to the south and north also have a bearing on the rise and fall of the 10-year-old Maoist war.
War and the Maobaadi
The Nepali state was born of the political, strategic and diplomatic experiences gained during the 75 years that started in the 1760s with the victorious unification process. This was followed by the expansionary war that subjugated the territory between the Teesta and Sutlej rivers, and the phase of defeat that concluded with the humbling Treaty of Sugauli with the Company Bahadur in 1816.
The strategy of the conquering chieftain of the principality of Gorkha, Prithvinarayan, was to bring the various principalities of the Himalayan midhills consecutively into his axis, even while seeking to stop the spread of the British Empire. Many of his tactics resemble those of the Nepali Maoists of today – keeping at bay the foreigners who wished to help the Valley's kings, building their fighting force from among the people, and waging an efficient guerrilla war. It took King Prithvinarayan 15 years of fighting to take Kathmandu Valley after leaving Gorkha, and he succeeded only after imposing an economic blockade and takeover of a fortress to the south.
The Maoists, for their part, have on occasion sought to block the highways into Kathmandu according to their 'surround and conquer' slogan. Prithvinarayan had found it easier to conquer the territories of the west, and for the east he had to use a combination of pacts and deceit. Today's insurgents have similarly found it easier to spread in western Nepal, which has become their stronghold, while they remain weaker in the east.