As the US mobilised its armed forces in the after math of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the world's attention focused on Pakistan, so crucial to military operations in Afghanistan. When Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf pledged total support for a US-led multinational force on 14 September, many people's first thought was: What about Pakistan's nuclear weapons? Could they fall into the hands of extremists? In an address to his nation, Musharraf proclaimed that the "safety of nuclear missiles" was one of his priorities. The Bush administration began to consider providing Pakistan with perimeter security and other assistance to guard its nuclear facilities.
The renewed concern about nuclear weapons in South Asia comes a little more than three years after the events of May 1998: the five nuclear tests conducted by India at Pokharan in the northwestern desert state of Rajasthan, followed three weeks later by six nuclear explosions conducted by Pakistan in its southwestern region of Chaghai. These tit-for-tat responses mirrored the nuclear buildup by the US and the former Soviet Union, with a crucial difference: the two Cold War superpowers were separated by an ocean and never fought each other openly. Neighbouring India and Pakistan have gone to war three times since British India was partitioned in 1947 into Muslim-majority and Hindu-majority states. Even now artillery guns regularly fire over the border (officially , a cease-fire line) in the disputed region of Kashmir.
In May 1999, just one year after the nuclear tests, bitter fighting broke out over the occupation of a mountain ledge near the Kashmiri town of Kargil. The twomonth conflict took a toll of between 1,300 (according to the Indian Government) and 1,750 (according to Pakistan) lives. For the first time since 1971, India deployed its air force to launch attacks. In response, Pakistani fighter planes were scrambled for fear they might be hit on the ground; air-raid sirens sounded in the capital city of Islamabad. High-level officials in both countries issued at least a dozen nuclear threats. The peace and stability that some historians and political scientists have ascribed to nuclear weapons-because nuclear nations are supposed to be afraid of mutually assured destruction-were nowhere in sight. Wiser counsel eventually prevailed. The end of the Kargil clash, however, was not the end of the nuclear confrontation in South Asia. The planned deployment of nuclear weapons by the two countries heightens the risks. With political instability a real possibility in Pakistan, particularly given the conflict in Afghanistan, the dangers have never been so near.
Learning to Love the Bomb