Following Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recent visit to Africa and the accompanying India-Africa Summit in Addis Ababa, this relationship across the Indian Ocean has come firmly into the spotlight. Like previous iterations, however, this time observers in India have analysed the situation through a lens that has been simultaneously India-centric (What can we do for Africa? What can Africa do for us?) and China-inflected (How can we compete with China in Africa?). While useful, such analyses do not sufficiently grasp the complexity of the matter, in part because they construct India and Africa as two monolithic entities in terms of their capacities and interests.
The Indian state is but one of multiple actors that can be clubbed together under the signifier 'India'. And this is assuming that the state itself can be considered a homogenous entity, which of course it is not. Even so, the Indian state is interested in Africa for a variety of reasons. State-owned entities such as ONGC Videsh, the petroleum company, want a share of African oil and gas reserves. Indian and African interests often (though not always) overlap in shaping the international trade regime, particularly in negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Somewhat tangentially, the Indian state seeks good relationships with African countries to further its geopolitical interests, such as gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and in various matters before the UN General Assembly, where the relatively small African countries gain prominence due to the 'one country, one vote' system.
Each of these three interests calls for a different type of engagement with 'Africa'. For securing contracts over resources, there is the possibility of more covert sorts of dealings between the Indian state and African elites – events that, once in the open, can be potentially embarrassing for India in Africa. In contrast, the more long-term UN-centred relations demand less self-centred thinking, and taking positions on international matters that are of a moral character. To this extent, measures that create popular goodwill among African populations are needed. WTO negotiations, though, are somewhat fraught because the bourgeoning manufacturing and service sectors in India demand different conditions of trade than does the traditional smallholder agricultural sector in both Africa and India. Even though India continues to view itself as a leading proponent of the poor countries' position in the WTO, shifts in its own economy towards the tertiary sector have forced it to reconsider its previous positions.
The other set of actors are African states, of course, and their heterogeneity complicates the picture still further. Countries in Africa vary significantly by size, level of development and extent of state democratisation. Moreover, there are considerable tensions within and between many countries. In the last few years, India has cultivated a close bond with Ethiopia, but that country shares troublesome relationships with its own neighbours, such as Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. With tacit US support, Ethiopia has in the recent past directly intervened in the civil wars of Sudan and Somalia, making it unpopular in the region. By extension, India risks being cast in a negative light in those countries. In the south of the continent, South Africa is widely considered an economic and political hegemon. To smaller states in the region, then, India stands as a potentially useful counterweight, though this could in turn upset Indian ties with South Africa.