Compare and contrast the two situations. In September last, Burma saw the first public protests in 20 years, primarily led by saffron-robed monks. In unison, the world community rose up to condemn the Rangoon junta. In the middle of March this year, the Tibetan Autonomous Region and Tibetan-populated territories beyond saw the largest public protests against Beijing since 1989, similarly led by saffron-robed monks. The world reaction this time was mostly limited to Tibetan refugees demonstrating in various host countries, together with supporters of the so-called Tibetan 'cause'. A resounding silence enveloped the world capitals, even as in Southasia the governments in Kathmandu and New Delhi made haste to block demonstrations so that the short-tempered Chinese dragon would not be too enraged.
The double-standard at work over the years in not taking Beijing to task for its colonial mentality on Tibet, is, of course, the result of China's growth as an economic colossus. Added to that, the governments of Southasia are confronted by the sheer geopolitical might of Beijing. The xenophobia of China vis-à-vis Tibet makes all kinds of foreign authorities, from Foggy Bottom to Whitehall to South Block to the International Olympic Committee, shun confrontation to the extent of appeasement. And it says something that, while the United Nations can depute Ibrahim Gambari as special envoy on Burma, the world body cannot utter a cautionary word on Tibet – much less assign a special representative.
While the international community's diffidence on the question of Tibet remains, what has changed seems to be the situation on the ground. We refer to the Tibetan people's newfound ability to raise a voice and a fist against the Chinese mainland's domination of their culture and space. This has taken place not only within the TAR, but also in territories within what can be termed 'greater Tibet', including in Sichuan and Gansu. Indeed, what unfolded during the latter half of March was a notably pan-Tibet uprising, triggered by arrests of monks demonstrating peacefully in Lhasa on 10 March. This quickly escalated, however, and led to violent clashes on 14 March, including attacks on people of mainland origin on the streets of Lhasa. The spread of protests elsewhere – pieced together from the reports in the Chinese press, and supplemented by videos posted on the Internet – soon became apparent to the outside world.
To give due credit, the fact that the Tibetans had the ability to face the cameras against the Chinese authorities, and to gather en masse in various parts, indicates a certain loosening of Beijing's hitherto rigid controls. Some of this may be the natural political by-product of the liberalisation of the Chinese economy, coupled with the inability of the authorities to control information the way they used to be able to. This evolving capacity to challenge the Chinese state is also evident among citizens in the mainland, who have been agitating recently, for example, against inflation and infrastructural projects that displace communities. But if the ability to raise one's voice against the all-powerful authorities of the Communist Party is new, as Himal goes to press it is unclear whether the party will evolve a soft line in reaction to the Tibet protests.