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Two years on

Near the two-year anniversary of Mohammed Nasheed’s election in the Maldives, democracy in the atolls continues to experience growing pains, made more difficult by an increasingly bipolar polity.

Two years on

In mid-September, the Maldives took its seat at the United Nations Human Rights Council, one of the smallest countries ever to hold a post in the body. This is all the more remarkable as, when the country was voted onto the Council earlier this year, it secured the highest number of votes ever registered – 185 out of 188, thus tying with India. For the newly democratised country this was indeed a proud moment, and an opportunity to build on its growing reputation as a regional and global champion of human rights. This was something that would have been unheard of just a few years ago, before the November 2008 election of Mohammed Nasheed and his longtime opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP). Thus it would seem that things were progressing splendidly for the Maldives, as a vibrant government had brought about the possibility of change and hope, a government that signalled the end of 30 years in power of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the longest-serving leader of Southasia. Yet behind the rosy picture of political freedom, and the touristy postcards, all is not well in the atolls.

First, a bit of background is necessary. The country's new Constitution from 2008, though drafted as a presidential system, had significant oversight mechanisms vested in the People's Majlis (the parliament), as well as the power to impeach the president with an absolute majority in that body. With no such oversight mechanism over the legislature provided to the executive, however, the president cannot dissolve the Majlis and call for elections. In retrospect, this constitutional lacuna has now become a significant stumbling block for the current government. Despite the significant political changes that have taken place in the Maldives in recent years, the opposition – led by former President Gayoom's Dhivehi Raiyyunthuge Party (DRP) – continues to hold a majority in the Majlis, with many members having been key players in the previous regime.

In addition, the Constitution stipulated a two-year transitional period, which ended on 7 August. During this time, pieces of legislation necessary for the smooth functioning of the Constitution were to be adopted, alongside the establishment of independent commissions to strengthen local governance and accountability, consolidate rule of law and curb corruption. Yet the deadline for the transitional period passed amidst the executive wrestling with both the Parliament and the judiciary, with accusations of others overstepping constitutional limits. Led by the interim chief justice, Abdulla Saeed, who had been appointed by the Gayoom government for the transitional period, early this year the interim bench of the Supreme Court sent a letter to President Nasheed declaring permanent the interim bench. At that time, the opposition-led Majlis had failed to pass legislation for a permanent Supreme Court, while President Nasheed's nomination for chief justice was still pending endorsement.

In late June, an en masse resignation of the cabinet took place, with the ministers saying that they were unable to carry out their duties due to parliamentary encroachment of their functions. In the lead-up to this event, the Majlis passed legislation that shifted some executive powers into the legislative. Amendments to the Civil Service Act, the Finance Act and the Police Act, for instance, systematically handed over executive powers to the legislative, from processing nominations for members of the Civil Service Commission (created under the Civil Service Act, noted earlier) to endorsing them, with the president's role reduced simply to overseeing the swearing-in process. The most recent amendments to the Finance Act would force the government to seek Majlis approval to raise loans from abroad and to rent state assets, an action that would have serious ramifications for government plans for privatisation. The president's veto powers are limited. Further, all of these amendments have been cleared from the Majlis with a two-thirds majority, forcing the president to ratify the changes as is.