In 2007, the euphoria over having achieved something substantial was palpable in Nepal, even though the differences between the major political parties had already begun to surface. After all, the decade-long Maoist-led insurgency had come to a formal end with the people's movement. The two-and-a-half-century-old monarchy had been effectively abolished. And the UN political mission in Nepal, UNMIN, was about to begin a one-year term on 23 January, vested with supporting the nascent peace process. The 'New Nepal' was about to unfold. Four years later, the UN mission has been forced to leave after a tenure that had some notable successes, a few controversies and a big goof-up, leaving some important peace-related tasks still pending. It was an exit that neither the UN bigwigs in New York and UNMIN officials nor the Nepalis had anticipated.
There was hardly any opposition to the UN mission being set up except some perceived resistance from India. The man named to head the mission, Ian Martin, had earned goodwill and respect as Nepal chief of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Thereafter, the UN Security Council established UNMIN with a fourfold mandate to: a) monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of the Nepal Army and the Maoist army, in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of November 2006; b) assist the parties through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee (JMCC) in implementing this agreement; c) assist in the monitoring of ceasefire arrangements; and d) provide technical assistance to the Election Commission for the election of a Constituent Assembly, which eventually took place in April 2008.
This mandate was never fully understood by the Nepali people, for several reasons. Politicians, journalists and members of civil society seemed hardly to read documents before making their opinions public; this was coupled with a motivated misreading by vested interests and growing and unmanageable differences between the Maoist and non-Maoist parties, who always found the UN mission an easy target. None of this was helped by UNMIN's late response to any misconception, its dogged refusal to acknowledge mistakes, and its inability to shake-off a developing pro-Maoist image.
Of the two main tasks entrusted to UNMIN – support to the elections and verifying former Maoist combatants – one was accomplished and the other generated huge controversy. Whatever the fairness of the 2008 elections (in which the Maoists came away as the largest party), UNMIN lent valuable material and expert support, though critics later condemned it for failing to advise against an election when one political party still had its own fighting forces. Positively, however, the meetings of the JMCC (chaired by UNMIN official and manned by representatives from Nepal Army and Maoist army), were largely cordial and fruitful.