When Sri Lanka surfaces in the international media it is almost invariably in connection with ethnic violence. Such stories have been grim and arresting in the last two decades. There have been mob riots in which the government has been complicitous. There have been dramatic military encounters where on a single day major army bases have fallen and a thousand soldiers have been killed. There have been devastations in the heart of the capital, Colombo, including an attack on the airport that destroyed the country´s fleet of international carriers. The bulk, though not all, of the violence of the last 20 years is an outcome of the long war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fighting for an independent Tamil homeland. In these two decades, the LTTE has emerged as a powerful, internationally active organisation claiming to be the sole representative of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. Its leader has a cult status and he commands an army of over 10,000 soldiers, each of whom has sworn to commit suicide by swallowing a cyanide rather than surrender.
However, things are beginning to change after the dramatic ceasefire agreement between Sri Lankan government and LTTE in February 2002 that followed nearly three months of unofficial ceasefire. Increasingly media coverage has focused on Sri Lanka as a possible model for peace making in a conflict-ridden region. South Asia, with its nuclear arsenals, geopolitical rivalries, ethnic conflicts and insurgencies, is regarded as being amongst the most unstable regions in the world. Consequently, there are many who see the recent developments in Sri Lanka as a possible indication that textbooks approaches to peace making, with third party mediation, can be successful.
All this optimism notwithstanding, it will be premature to regard the Sri Lankan conflict as a closed chapter. The question still remains whether a stable, negotiated peace that entails mutual compromise is possible in Sri Lanka. There are several reasons why this must still be treated as an open question despite the peace talks progressing to the fourth round. On the one hand, the LTTE´s highly military character, the deep division in the Sinhalese polity on several curcial issues, and the presence of economic vested interests who profit from conflict are serious obstacles to political reforms and compromise that induce a sense of prudent pessimism. On the other hand, a general weariness with war among the public at large, economic debilitation, financial exhaustion on both sides and the threat of the US-led war against terrorism inviting itself over to the island, puts pressure on the conflicting parties to compromise and resolve their disputes through political negotiations. Given these two conflicting sets of forces at work, the February 2002 ceasefire agreement, brokered under Norwegian diplomatic auspices, must be seen as a pragmatic response to one set of realities on the ground and in the environment, which has to contend with another set of realities that militate against peace. The negotiations, therefore, still hang in delicate balance, and there are good reasons to avoid the belief that peace will be the necessary outcome of the process.
At different points in the last year there have been occasions when the durability of ceasefire looked to be in some doubt. Demonstrating the fragility of the ceasefire at the initial and hence critical stage, the US embassy in Sri Lanka circulated a statement by its ambassador, Ashley Wills, just a month after hostilities had been officially and mutually called to a halt. Issued on 11 March 2002 the statement said, We have heard credible reports that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are engaged in activities that could jeopardise the recent indefinite ceasefire accord reached with the Sri Lankan government. These reports recount increased LTTE recruitment in Sri Lanka´s north and east, including of children, as well as kidnapping and extortion, especially of Muslims. To be fair, we understand that incidents of recruitment, kidnapping and extortion have apparently decreased in recent days, a trend that we hope will continue. There also have been credible reports of LTTE resupply operations since the ceasefire. Continued smuggling of weapons by the LTTE could undermine the trust needed to move from a cessation of hostilities to a lasting peace.